Now, I've always wanted to create a historical scenario. Unfortunately, I can't find any ideas! Sure, there's one or two I've thought of, but they seem unbalanced too much in the player's favour.
If anyone on this forum is a histoy buff (like myself *I would particularily enjoy creating a Viking, King Arthur or Saxon campaign/scenario. However, I am more interested in just designing a historical scenario. Thanks again. -Ultima_Knight
how is this for a quote
Here is a well outlined battle (Author Unkown):
The Battle of Versinikia 813: A Byzantine Blunder in the Balkans
In 813, the emperor Michael I led a major campaign to try and halt the inroads the Bulgars were making into his empire. Michael’s reputation was somewhat in the doldrums. He had obtained the Byzantine throne in what were black days for the Empire. The emperor Nikephoros I (802-811) had been slain at the disastrous battle of Pliska in 811,1 more an ambush than a battle, where Khan Krum and his Bulgars had smashed the imperial encampment in a pre-dawn attack. This was an unexpected turnaround of fortune from 809 when the army of Nikephoros had sacked the Bulgar capital of Pliska and it had seemed only a matter time before the Balkans were again reincorporated into the Empire. Staurakios, son of Nikephoros, although seriously wounded at the battle, briefly succeeded his father but was soon deposed and died shortly thereafter in a monastery. Michael Rhaggabe, son-in-law of Nikephoros, took the throne with the support of leading members of the church, Constantinople nobility and, importantly, the imperial army units, the tagmata (“the regiments”), in Constantinople.
The support of the church and its powerful patriarchs and bishops shouldn’t be underestimated in Byzantine politics. Religion was inextricably linked with the role and power of the emperor. Previous centuries had seen many Church (Oecumenical) Councils shift the balance of power from one group to another, involving periods where one doctire would reign supreme for a time whilst declaring others as heretic. Such was the case between the iconophiles (those who favoured images of Christ) and the iconoclasts (who used no imagery but the cross) during this period. In the early ninth century the iconophiles were on top following the purging of the declared heretical (and mostly eastern) iconoclast bishops after the Seventh Oecumenical Council of 787.2 The Empress Irene (empress in her own right from 797-802) supported this position as did her successors Nikephoros I and Michael I.
Michael’s performance to date after taking control of the throne had been one of inactivity and retreat. The army had lost many experienced officers and soldiers, most especially from the tagmatic and European theme units, at Pliska and support for the emperor from the armies of Europe and Asia was waning. He had to do something to save his imperial hide.
Provincial forces (themata) were summoned from Asia for the forthcoming campaign to stem the Bulgar ‘menace’. Unfortunately, the contingents from Asia either arrived early or the imperial division was slow to arrive and the provincial troops, now joined by the surviving European units, spent most of late spring idly billeted in Thrace. This put a heavy burden on the local population who had to supply them with provisions. Finally, the emperor arrived with the imperial troops and the army marched to Adrianople and established a camp near Versinikia.3
The Bulgars, under their khan Krum (805-814), arrived on 7th June and established a camp some 25 miles away. The armies were of disparate sizes, with the Byzantines outnumbering their Bulgar foes. The Macedonian commander, John Aplakes, is claimed to have said ten to one but Haldon4 estimates the forces possibly as high as 30,000 Byzantines to maybe 12,000 Bulgars. (It is worth noting that Aplakes was killed in the battle leading an heroic charge whilst the Byzantine emperor sat on the hill and left Aplakes unsupported. Thus, putting such words into the heroic Aplakes’ mouth is one way of discrediting the emperor Michael I as being responsible for an unnecessary defeat and therefore unfit to rule.)
Clearly, a waiting game was the best policy for Krum in the hope that the hardships of maintaining such a large army might force the Byzantines into precipitous action or risk their army dissolving as the summer wore on. Deserters and prisoners would have informed the Khan that feelings were running high in the Byzantine camp: some wished to wait, some wanted to attack whilst they had the advantages of numbers and position. All the while that they sat inactive the confidence of the provincial troops in their emperor to handle the situation was ebbing away. The army sat still in the heat of summer suffering accordingly. The army units from the Anatolikon thema in Asia Minor under the control of Leo were reported to have been particularly unhappy with their lot, many being new recruits fighting far from home.5
In the end, Aplakes forced the issue by announcing that he would attack and would expect the centre and other wing of the army to support him. Afterall, it was he and his men and their families and lands that were suffering directly at the hands of the Bulgars. By this stage of the Empire’s existence, its European ‘empire’ had largely disappeared and was mainly restricted to the two small buffer themes of Makedonia and Thrake.6 Haldon’s suggestion on the dispositions of the Byzantine forces are of possibly 8,000 thematic troops from the Macedonia and Thrace on one wing, a centre of 4,000 tagmatic cavalry and about 10,000 troops from the Thrakesion and Opsikion regions in Asia Minor, and the other wing containing maybe 8,000 from the regions of Anatolikon and Cappadocia.
Aplakes and his Macedonian troops led the initial attack. The charge downhill pushed back the Bulgars. The Thracian units then followed their Macedonian compatriots and charged in as well, forcing the Bulgars back further towards their camp and into their own reserves. Things were looking good for the Byzantines and it looked like one charge from the centre might complete the rout of the Bulgar army.
Unfortunately, the emperor never gave the order to attack, but sat timidly watching from the hill., With no extra pressure being applied, the Bulgar forces steadied and counterattacked Aplakes’ hapless troops. It was at this stage that the unoccupied wing of the Byzantine army under Leo began to withdraw in disorder. These troops are described as inexperienced, indisciplined and of poor morale so they may have just fallen apart in panic at the prospect of actually fighting the nasty Bulgars but as the general concerned later went on to become the emperor Leo V and was a keen supporter of the currently out of favour iconoclast religious party,7 outright treachery is not out of the question.
At the site of this withdrawal the centre units also panicked and broke, leaving Aplakes and his men to be massacred. Aplakes was killed but some troops managed to escape from the disaster. The Khan thought this may have been a feigned flight but probably soon realised it wasn’t and sent units in pursuit of the fleeing Byzantine troops. The Bulgars didn’t press the pursuit far as they were also tired from the battle and the Byzantines were able to hole up in convenient fortresses such as Adrianople. The Bulgars were also reported to have been kept busy picking up quantities of abandoned weapons and armour thrown away by the Byzantine troops in their panic to flee.
Aftermath
Leo’s Anatolikon troops made it unscathed to Constantinople where they promptly rebelled and acclaimed Leo as emperor. It is reported that soldiers of the tagmata garrisoned in Constantinople broke into the tomb of the hero and founder of the tagmata Constantine V (741-775) and called on him to lead them again to victory and prosperity through a return to iconoclasm. (Constantine V campaigned against the Bulgars over a 20 year period and had come close to destroying the Bulgar khanate completely.) However, as Leo seems to have stage managed some other religious ‘miracles’ that suggested a return to iconclasm was the true path, this event can’t be put past him also!
Michael I, finally judging things correctly, promptly abdicated and departed to a monastery. Unfortunately, the cost to the empire had been the destruction of the remainder of the western provincial units and a another disgraceful major defeat.
Leo V (813-820) held another church council in 815 which declared iconclasm as the ‘true’ religion and the leading iconophile patriarch, bishops and monks were exiled. As the council was only attended by the iconclast supporting eastern bishops, this result was never in doubt! The empress Irene’s magnificent mosaic icon of Christ that had adorned the Chalke gate was removed and replaced with a cross. This heralded the Second Byzantine Iconoclasm (815-842).
Interestingly, the cabal of officers that had plotted to remove Michael I and return iconoclasm eventually fell out and set too amongst themselves. Leo was murdered at Christmas Mass by his former comrade Michael who set himself up as Michael II (820-829). The third member of the cabal, Thomas the Slav, then kicked off a civil war in his bid for the throne which was brought to a head with a yearlong siege of Constantinople and the defeat of the Thomas. Thomas had been negotiating with both the Caliph in Baghdad and the emperor Louis and the Pope in the west for support, neither of which appeared.8
Ideas
A question that has to be asked is how do you game a battle where two-thirds of an apparently winning army routs for no apparent reason? If all the Byzantine units had played their part, things looked bleak for the Bulgars. Well, I hope to investigate some of these ideas a bit further.
Three developments form the basis of the Byzantine army. Firstly, the ‘fed-up’ behaviour of Aplakes in seeking to break the deadlock. Basically, Aplakes must attack. Socially, this is correct as it was the land of the troops from Macedonia and Thrace that was under threat from the Bulgars.
Secondly, the inactivity or timidity of the emperor Michael I. His inability to spot the opportunity or to lead the attack in support of his vassals that may have won the battle marks him out as no military genius. He had no military reputation. Thus, the troops of his command can be excused from denigration as they were only following the lack of an order!
Thirdly, the troops of Leo and even Leo himself. Poor quality troops or treachery? Could be both or either. Both can be represented in a wargame to represent their poor showing but the breakdown in the command and authority of the emperor is essential.
What about the Bulgars? We shouldn’t forget them, as they were an important part of this process! They seemed to have acted in a relatively disciplined manner. They patiently waited around for the Byzantines to make the first move, although, as the sources are all Byzantine with varying political agendas, if mass desertion was taking place in the Bulgar army we probably would not hear about it. They were also not afraid to fight in a position not favourable to themselves, i.e. downhill of the enemy. They could have retired but perhaps there were political motives for the Khan to consider –retiring usually resulting in a loss of face and potential dissolution of his own army and prestige (look what happened to the Avars). Bulgar reserve troops are also mentioned so a double line system, perhaps shorter, but similar to Byzantine deployment ideas is not out of the question. Long contact in warfare and diplomacy with the Byzantines may have rubbed off.
General Points on Byzantine Troop Numbers
Haldon goes into detail discussing reported sizes of Byzantine tagmata and themata units of this period as does Heath.9 Both conclude that there is confusion over just how large the units were and how much variation there was throughout the era between Maurice’s Strategikon (late 6th century) and the Tactica of Leo VI (early 10th century). It also appears most likely that different numbers and different proportions of cavalry to infantry were obtained between different themes at different times. The seasonal nature of campaigns, the freedom of local commanders to select their troops and the non-regulated formation of these troops into bodies on the battlefield all make it difficult to predict numbers in Byzantine armies of this period. From the Tactica (repeating the formula used in the Strategikon)10 we have each army corps (thema) consisting of three tourmai, each then divided into three drouggoi and each of these further sub-divided into a number of banda (or tagmata). Unfortunately, our various sources list different thema providing various numbers of tourmai (often 3 to 5) and variance in the size of individual banda – 200 to 400 men in the Tactica but 50 to 200 in other tenth century sources.
The forces of the tagmata stationed at Constantinople probably numbered in the region of 4,000 to 6,000 men during the 8th and 9th centuries. Nikephoros I (802-811) divided the tagmatic forces into imperial and provincial tagmata with the former remaining stationed at Constantinople.11 These increased dramatically during the latter half of the 10th century when the reorganised Byzantine army was on the offensive under a succession of aggressive emperors and mercenaries were freely employed to fill the ranks of these full-time professional units.
It is important to note that the < General Points on the Byzantine Troops Some general points on the armies are also worth looking at. One thing that is rarely, if ever, mentioned with the Byzantine army of the 8th and 9th centuries is the use, or lack of use, of mounted archery. Haldon’s view that the preferred weapon of the Byzantine cavalry of this period is the lance is probably an accurate assessment based on the evidence and Nicolle supports this.12 The early 10th century Tactica of Leo VI deplores the complete decline in archery skill of the Romans and the defeats attributable to this.13 The picture painted by this military treatise and even the Strategikon is one that looks at odds with the performance of the provincial troops during the 8th and 9th centuries. Although bows may have still been carried by Byzantine cavalrymen in the intervening period and some units of archers may have existed, their continued difficulty with Turkish-style tactics and the lack of mention to Byzantine mounted archery points to a different conclusion. The provincial and part-time thematic Byzantine cavalry had neither the skill nor the tactical training to utilise the bow effectively in battle. Haldon goes so far as to suggest that the Byzantine composite lancer/horse archer is probably something of a myth for this period. Even the reforming emperors of the latter half of the 10th century placed great emphasis on creating more effective bodies of infantry archers, realising mounted archery skills could be obtained from outside the empire (similarities with the Roman armies of the 5th and 6th centuries employing Huns and their ilk?). It’s also most probable that horse armour amongst the thematic troops was used in only a limited capacity if at all. These men were equipping themselves and, although Constantinople and some of the eastern themes were still relatively wealthy, the western themes were not. Extensive use of horse armour may also be at odds with the fast moving cavalry tactics of Byzantine armies of this period, where intercepting enemy raids was paramount, but this is not to discount its use on the battlefield. The armies mustered for the Pliska and Versinikia campaigns were major forces deployed to fight battles. Thus, the horse armour of individuals could be easily transported in the bagage and brought out ‘on the day’ that battle was expected. Thus, I would be somewhat reluctant to use the near-perfect state of play presented by the early 10th century Tactica (and army lists derived from this) for looking at the thematic Byzantine cavalry of this period. The provincial cavalry should be presented as more of a mixed bag but based on formations of poor to reasonable quality cavalrymen equipped with lance, sword, shield and helmet. Many cavalrymen probably also wore a scale or mail corselet judging by the pursuing Bulgars stopping to pick up the discarded Byzantine armour at Versinikia and that mail/scale/lamellar armour was fairly standard panoply for many cavalry in this period. Bows may have still been carried and usefully employed by the better quality cavalry but the ownership of a weapon and the ‘wish list’ of military treatise writers (and reformers) needs to be balanced with the reality of performance. The heavy cavalry of the imperial tagmata are a different story however and were probably well trained and equipped.14 However, the same cautions mentioned above apply here. We don’t hear of them using mounted archery tactics (although this could be survival of the evidence). Just because you have numbers of weapons, a method beloved of wargamers for justifying minute differences in effectiveness between their troops, does not mean you were able to use them in a battlefield environment. The status of Byzantine infantry in this period seems to be at something of an all time low. Whilst they had their uses on campaign for sieges, ambushes and garrison duties, their battlefield role appears to be a very passive and defensive one. The lack of training also seems to be a major problem. At Versinikia the description of the Anatolikon troops is as indisciplined raw recruits. Battles of the period are all about cavalry actions and the sources of the period frequently only talk of cavalry. The emperor Basil I (867-86) is dubiously credited with improving the training of the infantry15 and the reforming emperors of the 10th century put a lot of effort into the training of effective heavy infantry.16 The strategic situation of the empire in the 8th and 9th centuries was one of rapid pursuit of raiding enemy forces and of trying to herd them towards traps and ambushes (“dog and pounce” as the DBM list puts it).17 Campaigning had become seasonal with forces raised locally. Thus, the poor quality of Byzantine infantry of the 8th and 9th centuries paints an interesting parallel to that pictured in the Strategikon and that which was to come in the offensive wars of the 10th century. Haldon’s summary on the poor performance, equipment and lowly status of Byzantine infantry in the 7th to 9th centuries is well worth reading.18 The type of warfare the army was generally involved in denied the infantry the experience it needed to become effective. Notes on the Bulgar Army Bulgar numbers are harder to determine. Haldon’s figure of 12,000 mentioned above is no more than an estimate. We can safely assume they were outnumbered. The Bulgar army had taken a major defeat at the hands of the Byzantines in 809. Haldon mentions allied Slav troops and remnants of the Avars fighting for the Khan at their victory at Pliska.19 Nicolle talks about Slav infantry forming the bulk of the army during this period.20 The ambush at Pliska in 811 was probably a desperate move on the part of the Khan based on astute tactical opportunism coupled with a shortage of troops with which to face a large Byzantine army in open battle. At Versinikia the Khan decided to stand up to another large Byzantine army although outnumbered. Perhaps he had information from deserters (or foreknowledge of treachery?) that all was not well in the Byzantine camp and he decided to risk it. Perhaps the prestige of his kingship relied on a successful battle to supply his troops with booty – the battle at Versinikia may have been an ‘all or nothing’ gamble on his part?21 Another sacking of his capital whilst his army avoided battle would not have proven an astute political move! Khan Krum established quite a reputation as a military leader and the Bulgar army, heavily influenced by that of Byzantium, was probably well equipped, most especially with the booty gathered at the battle of Pliska two years previously. Krum’s personal retinue may have operated under some degree of discipline judging by its performance.
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